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LAW, ECONOMICS, AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY: STATE OF THE
ART AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES+
Peer Zumbansen and Gralf‐Peter Calliess*

“THE POWER OF LAW TO SURVIVE THROUGH CENTURIES IS EQUALLY APPARENT.
As a consequence a great deal, if not most, of law operates
in a territory for which it was not originally designed,
or in a society which is radically different
from that which created the law.”1

I. BEFORE THE EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGE: ECONOMICS AND LAW DISCOVER
INSTITUTIONS AND ‘SOCIAL NORMS’
In 1859 Charles Darwin published his most acclaimed work, On the Origin of Species, and after
that nothing was the same in the history of human knowledge.2 Darwin’s work did not only
radically change our perception of the origin and development of nature. His ideas on the
mechanisms of evolution were soon transferred to the social sciences, though often in
misconceived forms such as ‘social Darwinism’3 or caught up in highly charged, polemical
+

This is the introduction essay to Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory (Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter
Calliess eds., Edward Elgar 2010), forthcoming. We are grateful to Mauro Zamboni for helpful research and
comments on an earlier version of this paper.
*

Peer Zumbansen holds the Canada Research Chair in Economic Governance and Legal Theory, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, Toronto and is Regular Visiting Professor at the Collaborative Research Centre
‘Transformations of the State’ at the University of Bremen. Visiting Professor in Transnational Law and Corporate
Governance, University College Dublin, School of Law, 2009-2010. Founder and director of the Critical Research
Laboratory in Law & Society at Osgoode Hall Law School. Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. Gralf-Peter
Calliess holds the Chair in Private Law, International and Comparative Economic Law, University of Bremen and is
Director at the Collaborative Research Centre ‘Transformations of the State’. Email: calliess@uni-bremen.de.
1

A. Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture', (1982) 131 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
1121-1157, 1125

2

See C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in
the Struggle for Life (1st ed.) 1859); see further the general overview as to both the roots of and the debate Darwin’s
ideas created in P. J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea (3rd ed.) (University of California Press, 2003).

3

See D. P. Johnson, 'The Historical Background of Social Darwinism', (2008) in: Johnson, Contemporary
Sociological Theory: An Integrated Multi-Level Approach 492-494;H. Haferkamp/N. J. Smelser, 'Introduction', in H.
Haferkamp and N. J. Smelser (eds), Social Change and Modernity (University of California Press, 1992), 4-6; for a
particular (post WW I) observation on German scientists’ embrace of Darwinism, see A. G. Keller, 'Law in
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debates surrounding school curricula and the collision of religion and evolution.4 As Kurt Dopfer
recently noted, “[t]he publication of On the Origin of Species by Charles Darwin in 1859 set off a
paradigmatic earthquake in the sciences, and to some degree in society at large.”5 Since then,
evolutionary concepts have been successfully applied, refined and drawn upon to explain long‐
term developments and change in human relations, societies, culture, and civilization. In
jurisprudence, authors like Henry Sumner Maine6 and Oliver Wendell Holmes7 have relied on
evolutionary ideas for explaining the structures of change in the common law. Despite
differences in opinion regarding the analogies between biological and legal evolution, legal
scholars writing after Holmes generally acknowledged a degree of purpose in legal
interpretation and statutory legislation: “A novel statute or precedent suggests […] variation
(purposeful, perhaps, but still variation) in a general flow of things in which there is a continuing
response to the call of circumstance – adjustment to environment. The nature of the process is
apt to be observed by that lack of perspective which prevents us from seeing the old and the
new in their true relation. The legislator is not, as he may imagine himself, a Columbus. Not
infrequently, he is merely making explicit what was really implicit in pre‐existing law.”8 Besides
this distinct disrespect of the Legal Realists for the contention that judges were merely engaged
in ‘finding’ the law’, legal scholars quickly began to ascertain the relevance not only of
comparative9 but also of historical, detailed studies of different legal cultures, if one wanted to
make any more generalizable assertions regarding legal change.10
Meanwhile, in economic theory, Schumpeter’s11 emphasis on economic growth as the key to
economic analysis helped prepare the ground for evolutionary theory, himself harkening back
Evolution', (1918) 28 Yale Law Journal 769-783, 777; see the response of Keller’s discussion of social and legal
evolution by W. J. Brown, 'Law and Evolution', (1919) 29 Yale Law Journal 394-400, in particular 397, 398: “I
think the term ‘legal evolution’ a useful and suggestive way of expressing some of the most fundamental
characteristics of the long process involved in the history of law.”
4

See, e.g., G. Frazzetto, 'Who’s Afraid of Darwin?' (2004) 5 European Molecular Biology Organization 662-665;
see also: The Social and Legal Dimensions of the Evolution Debate in the United States, Pew Forum on Religion
and Public Life, 4 February 2009, available at: http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=396.
5

K. Dopfer, 'Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundation of
Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-55, 12.

6

HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861), chapter 2.

7

OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881), chapters 1 and 2; O. W. Holmes, 'Law in Science and Science in
Law', (1899) 12 Harvard Law Review 443-463
8

W. J. Brown, 'Law and Evolution', (1919) 29 Yale Law Journal 394-400, 398, 399

9

See, for example, J. P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (The University of Michigan Law School, 1968).

10

A. Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture', (1982) 131 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 1121-1157, 1122, 1124-25: “To understand the nature of legal change and the relationship between legal
rules and society, I believe it is necessary to look at a number of legal systems and at the changes in them over a
long period of time.” The article is of particular interest for Watson’s response to critics from within the ‘law &
society” movement contesting his claim of a ‘divergence of law & society’.

11

J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), with a new introduction by Thomas McCraw
(Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2008)
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onto Smith’s inquiry into circumstances contributing to the particular dynamics of economic
change in his time.12 Subsequently, in particular Hayek’s 1945 knowledge‐based account of
market processes13 and Alchian’s 1950 essay on ‘Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic
Theory’14 were among the first to pave the way for a promising promotion of evolutionary
concepts in economics15, with important parallel developments in the natural sciences.16 As we
will discuss below, evolutionary thinking has continued to play a particularly important role in
the development of more recent economic theorizing about economic growth and social
change, in particular in its challenging the neo‐classical economists, again, with Schumpeter
sounding the bells of attack early on.17 It was above all the focus on the dynamics of economic
change in contrast to the neoclassicals’ focus on mechanics and to a model analysis of
economic equilibria that would eventually open doors to the wealth of institutional and
interdisciplinary economic thinking that characterizes the work by scholars such as Douglass C.
North, Sidney G. Winter and Richard R. Nelson, Oliver E. Williamson and Elinor Ostrom. This
economic analysis is importantly complemented and embedded in the historical‐economic
work by scholars such as Joel Mokyr and Paul David18 and the sociological work by scholars such

12

R. R. Nelson, 'Understanding economic growth as the central task of economic analysis', in F. Malerba and S.
Brusoni (eds), Perspectives on innovation (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 27-41.
13

F. Hayek, 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', (1945) 35 American Economic Review 519-530; F. A. Hayek,
'Competition as a Discovery Procedure (orig. German 1968; Marcellus S. Snow transl.)', (2002) 5 Quarterly Journal
of Austrian Economics 9-23; see also F. A. v. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1949).
14

A. A. Alchian, 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory', (1950) 58 Journal of Political Economy 211-221

15

For an account of the parallel emergence of evolutionary thinking in social and natural sciences, see D. L. Hull,
Science as a Process. An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (University of
Chicago Press, 1988). See also D. L. Hull, 'Die Rezeption von Darwins Evolutionstheorie bei britischen
Wissenschaftsphilosophen des 19. Jahrhunderts', in E.-M. Engels (ed) Die Rezeption von Evolutionstheorien im 19.
Jahrhundert (Suhrkamp, 1995), 67-104, and H. Haken, 'Synergetics: from physics to economics', in K. Dopfer (ed)
The Evolutionary Foundation of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 70-85.
16

See previous note. Compare also Prigogine’s observation that “[L]aws of nature no longer express certitudes, but
‘possibilities’”, cited in K. Dopfer, 'Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework', in K. Dopfer (ed) The
Evolutionary Foundation of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-55, 11.
17

J. A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (1934). With a New Introduction by John E. Elliott
(Transaction Publishers, 1983); Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942).
18

See J. Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena. Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton University Press,
2002), Ch. 7, and J. Mokyr, 'The Knowledge Society: Theoretical and Historical Underpinnings', (2005)
faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jmokyr/Unitednations.PDF ; J. Mokyr, 'Is there a theory of economic history?' in K.
Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundation of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 195-218; Mokyr, in
this volume. P. A. David, 'Path dependence in economic processes: implications for policy analysis in dynamical
systems contexts', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundations of Economics (Cambridge University Press,
2008), 151-194; David, in this volume.
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as Nico Stehr and Volker Meja.19 The 2009 award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to
Williamson and Ostrom constitutes an important milestone in the evolution of economic and
institutional thought and invites us to cast a light back onto this theoretical tracjectory over the
preceding decades, opening up an ample view of the manifold overlappings and reciprocal
enrichments that have been occurring between economic and legal theorizing. Such attempts
at mutual understanding and enrichment are certain to encounter numerous roadblocks and
impasses, not least due to the co‐evolutionary nature of the respective fields and their
rationalities.20 While the breathtaking ascendance of ‘law and economics’21 has irreversibly
transformed both practice and theory of law, the economist’s depiction of this alleged cross‐
disciplinary dialogue is as legendary22 as the potential interdisciplinary dialogue between law
and economics has often been confined.
The project pursued in the present volume hopes to go beyond the ‘law and economics’
perspective that has been so immensely influential in legal practice and academia by focusing
on the dimension of evolution within each of the two disciplines in order to carve out, from that
perspective, the possible future possibilities and directions of cross‐disciplinary pollination
between legal and economic thinking. With both disciplines inherently aspiring to conceptualize
models, principles and systems of social order, the discovery of a dynamic dimension in the
development of the respective apparatus could not come as a surprise: evidently, in both
disciplines, law and economics, different ideas of evolution have long inspired a host of varying
usages and assessments.23
Our suggested task of identifying instantiations of a meaningful reciprocal engagement
between legal and economic thought is likely to bring to the fore particular moments of debate
19

N. Stehr, Knowledge and economic conduct: the social foundations of the modern economy (University of
Toronto, 2002); N. Stehr, 'Knowledge Societies', in N. Stehr and V. Meja (eds), Society & Knowledge.
Contemporary Perspectives in the Sociology of Knowledge and Science (Transaction Publishers, 2005), 299-322; N.
Stehr/V. Meja (eds), Society & Knowledge. Contemporary Perspectives in the Sociology of Knowledge & Science
(Transaction Publishers, 2005).
20

K. Dopfer, 'Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundation of
Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-55, 18: “A young discipline, such as evolutionary economics,
suffers from a language deficit.” Compare with Amstutz, in this volume and with G. Teubner, 'Idiosyncratic
Production Regimes: Co-evolution of Economic and Legal Institutions in the Varieties of Capitalism', in J. Ziman
(ed) The Evolution of Cultural Entities: Proceedings of the British Academy (Oxford University Press, 2002), 161182.
21

D. M. Branson, 'A Corporate Paleontologist’s Look at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit', (1989) 65
Chicago-Kent Law Review 745, 745, likened its proliferation in academic corporate law to a ‘prairie fire’. See also,
B. R. Cheffins, 'The Trajectory of (Corporate) Law Scholarship', (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 456-506.
22

See only the debate between Coase and Simpson: A. W. B. Simpson, '"Coase v. Pigou" Reexamined', (1996) 25
Journal of Legal Studies 53-97; A. W. B. Simpson, 'An Addendum: [A Response to Law and Economics and A. W.
Brian Simpson by R. H. Coase]', (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies 99-101, and R. H. Coase, 'Law and Economics
and A. W. Brian Simpson', (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies 103-119. See also the recent revisiting of this dispute
by H. Hovenkamp, 'The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou', (2009) 51 Arizona Law Review 633-649.
23

For an excellent assessment, see E. D. Elliott, 'The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence', (1985) 85 Columbia
Law Review 38-94.
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or outstanding publications that had a decisive impact on the development of this disciplinary
co‐existence. Clearly, Coase’s 1960 article on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, said to have ‘had
more policy influence than any other economic text’24, marks without doubt one such historical
moment. The research and teaching agenda, it projected for lawyers in the decades to come,
were immense, despite Coase’s own perhaps tongue‐in‐cheek assertion that his interest in fact
had never been to give rise to any such thing as ‘law and economics’.25 Aptly identified by
Coase then and later, was the complexity of adequately bridging the two disciplines in order to
make meaningful assertions across the fence. And yet, today, there can be no doubt that in
spite of such challenges, lawyers have anything but grown tired to apply economic thinking to
the development of legal frameworks, across a wide range of legal fields. Meanwhile,
economists have been persistent in assessing the role and increasingly the ‘nature’ of legal
regulation in relation to alternative forms of social ordering, something that has been both
informing and shaping the evolution of theoretical work done on property rights26 on the basis
of which emerged comprehensive concepts of economic governance27, the economics of
institutions28, institutional diversity29, and social norms.30 This work has altogether contributed
to the development of fairly robust assessments of the ‘environment’ of economic
development drawing on a host of different disciplinary depictions of formal and informal
institutions.31 As powerfully illustrated by the recently again increased interest in ‘informal
rules’ or, social norms, there appears to be a shared perception among economists and lawyers
of how customs, social practices, indigenous norms challenge can fit into the description of
legal enforcement mechanisms embedding an otherwise far‐reaching system of social self‐
24

Hovenkamp, 2009, at 649.

25

R. H. Coase, 'Law and Economics and A. W. Brian Simpson', (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies 103-119, 104105.
26

H. Demsetz, 'Towards a theory of property rights', (1967) 57 American Economic Review 347-359; D. C. North,
Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981), 17-19.
27

O. E. Williamson, 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead', (2000) 38 Journal of
Economic Literature 595-613; O. E. Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance', (2005) 95 American Economic
Review 1-18.
28

T. Eggertsoon, Economic behavior and institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1990); T. Eggertsson, 'A note on
the economics of institutions', in L. J. Alston, T. Eggertsoon and D. C. North (eds), Empirical Studies in Institutional
Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6-24, 25: “…at the frontier of research there is also a need and scope
for experimental work with an alternative paradigm.”
29

E. Ostrom, 'Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis', (2007)
3 Journal of Institutional Economics 239-264.
30
31

J. N. Drobak (ed) Norms and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

T. Eggertsson, 'A note on the economics of institutions', in L. J. Alston, T. Eggertsoon and D. C. North (eds),
Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6-24, 11: “As the institutional
framework consists of formal and informal rules and their enforcement, research at this level intrudes into the
domain of political science, sociology, and anthropology, along with law and history.”
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regulation, precisely because the ‘legal’ nature of these social norms is in question. Particularly
in light of the work done by sociologists and lawyers regarding the changing nature of state
regulation in the context of privatization of norm‐creation and the delegation of law‐making
authority to private and quasi‐public bodies32, economic theorizing has become increasingly
sensitive to the unpacked assumptions relating to the desired stability of property rights
enforcement33, with the more long‐term consequences of this development and the more
recent interest in the cognitive basis for individual choice‐making34 still to be assessed. What
seems to be clear, however, is that both economists and legal scholars are hard at work at
further scrutinizing the dynamics of the evolution of both formal and informal rules, the former
being interested to a large degree in the challenges of informal rules to the devising of sound
economic models for emerging or transforming economies35, while the latter are engaged in a
critique of the political nature of social norms.36

II. MEANWHILE: ADVANCES IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW
In many ways, these developments can be said to have their origin in theoretical advances
made in sociology, economics and legal theory. As regards the first, in 1983, the German
sociologist Niklas Luhmann published what would soon be regarded as a seminal work: Social
Systems. In this book, Luhmann reconceptualized Talcott Parsons’ theory of social systems on
the basis of the biological concept of autopoiesis.37 Luhmann thus aimed at developing an all‐
32

A good overview is provided by O. Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought', (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342-469. See also the analysis and critique by
A. Aman Jr., 'Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-Liberal State', (2007) 51 New York Law
School Review 802.
33

E. Ostrom, 'Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis', (2007)
3 Journal of Institutional Economics 239-264; see already E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity
(Princeton University Press, 2005), 21-22, drawing on the legal pluralist critique on rigid rule categorizations along
the lines of ‘public’ or ‘private’.
34

T. Eggertsson, 'A note on the economics of institutions', in L. J. Alston, T. Eggertsoon and D. C. North (eds),
Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6-24, 21; see also R. Aguilera/D.
Rupp/C. A. Williams/J. Ganapathi, 'Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: a Multi-Level Theory of
Social Change in Organizations', (2004) 32 Academy of Management Review 836-863
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567842].
35

See eg O. E. Williamson, 'The Institutions and Governance of Economic Development and Reform', (1996) Oliver
Williamson, The Economics of Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press 322-343; and from the point of view
of law, see R. A. Posner, 'Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development', (1998) 13 The World Bank
Research Observer 1-11.
36

E. A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press, 2000); G. K. Hadfield/E. Talley, 'On Public
versus Private Provision of Corporate Law', (2006) 22 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 414-441; see the discussion in G.-P.
Calliess/P. Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart
Publishing, 2010), ch. 2, ch. 5.
37

N. LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS [GERMAN ORIG.: 1984; JOHN BEDNARZ & DIRK BAECKER TRANSL.] (STANFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1996)
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encompassing theory of society as a self‐referential system of communication, explicitly
drawing upon evolutionary approaches.38 Luhmann’s concept of evolution, which constituted a
crucial element for his general theory of society, played a decisive role for law: by explaining
how evolution occurred through an unending process of variation, selection and retention,
Luhmann was able to provide an intricably persuasive model for the explanation of legal change
– a model which was on the one hand extremely sensitive to the ‘embeddedness’ of law in
social structures – much like the Realists had indeed seen it – but at the same time,
emphasizing law’s particular mode of change, adaptation and evolution.39 With view to the fate
of evolutionary theory in law, it is important to note, that legal theorists close to systems
theory – such as Gunther Teubner40 and Karl‐Heinz Ladeur41 – have always insisted on a
particular, critical distance to social theories of law’s embeddedness on the one hand and to
theories of the ‘unity of law’42 on the other, while certainly engaging with the same conceptual
challenges – concerning the relationship between law and society – that these theories were
facing. Over time, these explorations have contributed to a considerably rich landscape of
conceptual and theoretical assessments of law’s evolutionary trends and prospects – studies
that eventually received important impulses from both comparative legal scholarship43 as well
38

See also N. Luhmann, 'Evolution und Geschichte', (1975) in: ders., Soziologische Aufklärung 2 150-169; N.
Luhmann, 'Geschichte als Prozeß und die Theorie sozio-kultureller Evolution', in K.-G. Faber and Meyer (eds),
Historische Prozesse (Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1978), 413-440; N. Luhmann, 'Verfassung als evolutionäre
Errungenschaft', (1989) 9 Rechtshistorisches Journal 176-220.
39

For a concise reconstruction of law’s mode of change, see only G. Teubner, 'Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A
Rejoinder to Blankenburg', (1984) 18 Law & Society Review 291-301; but see also the recent, highly interesting
development of this theory in G. Teubner, 'Self-subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendency Formula of
Law?' (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 1-23.
40

G. Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law', (1983) 17 Law & Society Review 239-285

41

See the April 2009 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL Symposium in celebration of Professor Ladeur’s work “The Law of
the Network Society” (Eds.,L Viellechner et al.,
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol10No04/pdf_table_of_contents_Vol_10_No_04.pdf)
42

See, for example, the work by M. Baldus, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Bedeutungen einer juristischen Formel
in Rechtstheorie, Zivil- und Staatsrechtswissenschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Duncker & Humblot, 1995), and
by D. Felix, Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Zur verfassungsrechtlichen Relevanz einer juristischen
Argumentationsfigur (Mohr Siebeck, 1998); for an earlier, decidedly political rejection of a concept of ‘unity of
law’, see F. L. Neumann, 'The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society', (1964) Neumann, The
Democratic and the Authoritarian State (1957) 22-68, and the excellent study on Carl Schmitt by I. Maus,
Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus. Zur sozialen Funktion und aktuellen Wirkung der Theorie Carl Schmitts
(1976) (Wilhelm Fink, 1980).
43

See G. Frankenberg, 'Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law', (1985) 26 Harvard International
Law Journal (Harv. Int'l L.J.) 411-455; R. Buxbaum, 'Die Rechtsvergleichung zwischen nationalem Staat und
internationaler Wirtschaft', (1996) 60 RabelsZ 201-230; R. Sacco, 'Souvernirs d'un vieux comparatiste', (2002) ZEuP
727-736; M. Reimann, 'The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century',
(2002) 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 671-700; H. P. Glenn, 'Doin' the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions',
(2005) 50 McGill Law Journal 863-898; A. Riles, 'A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the
Technicalities', (2005) 53 Buffalo Law Review 973.
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as from a fast emerging scholarship focusing on the conundrical yet intriguing coupling of
‘globalization and the law’.44 The continuing, indeed highly productive tension between
normative and systems theoretical accounts of the continuing transformation of state
governance within and beyond the confines of the nation state has been informing and shaping
an immensely rich debate.45
Around the same time, that Luhmann had published ‘Social Systems’, a small revolution
occurred in economics that elevated evolutionary theory onto a stage for everyone to see and
consolidated its place in the discipline: In 1982, the economists Richard Nelson and Sydney
Winter laid out a systematic account of evolutionary elements in the theory of business and
economics46, by publishing a book that has been depicted as an ‘ice‐breaker that arguably gave
the early process its critical momentum.’47 At the outset of their program was the observation
that the dramatic dimensions of technological change posed particular challenges to economic
theories of growth. From this premise, Nelson & Winter revisited Schumpeter’s contribution in
search of inspiration and encouragement48 to think beyond neo‐classical frameworks that they
found to be at odds with a highly differentiated landscape of economic innovation and

44

G. Teubner, 'The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism', (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1443-1462;
G. Teubner, 'The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy', (1997) 31 Law & Society
Review 763-787; P. Zumbansen, 'Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law', (2002) 8
European Law Journal 400-432; G.-P. Calliess, 'Lex Mercatoria: A Reflexive Law Guide To An Autonomous Legal
System', in: 2 German Law Journal 17 (1 November 2001) available at:
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=109; P. S. Berman, 'From International Law to Law and
Globalization', (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 485-556; C. Scott, 'A Core Curriculum for the
Transnational Legal Education of JD and LLB Students: Surveying the Approach of the International, Comparative
and Transnational Law Program at Osgoode Hall Law School', (2005) 23 Penn State International Law Review 757773.
45

See, for example, the contributions to H. Brunkhorst (ed) Demokratie in der Weltgesellschaft (Nomos, 2009), M.
Schulte/R. Stichweh (eds), Weltrecht (Duncker & Humblot, 2008) and Peer Zumbansen & Achilles Skordas (eds.),
The Kantian Project of International Law: Engagements with Jürgen Habermas’ ‘The Divided West’, 10 German
Law Journal 1-114 (2009), available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=2&vol=10&no=1.
See already the contributions to P. Niesen/B. Herborth (eds), Anarchie der kommunikativen Freiheit. Jürgen
Habermas und die Theorie der internationalen Politik (Suhrkamp, 2007).
46

R. R. Nelson/S. G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1982); see already their essays leading up to the book: R. Nelson/S. Winter, 'Toward an
evolutionary theory of economic capabilities', (1973) 63 American Economic Review 440-449; R. Nelson/S. Winter,
'Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of Economic Growth: Critique and Prospectus', (1974) 84 American
Economic Review 886-905; for a discussion of Nelson’s and Winter’s proximity to Schumpeter and an ultimately
skeptical assessment of Nelson’s & Winter’s contribution, see V. W. Ruttan, 'Induced Innovation, Evolutionary
Theory and Path Dependence: Sources of Technical Change', (1997) 107 The Economic Journal 1520-1529, at
1524: “dead end”
47

K. Dopfer, 'Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundation of
Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-55, 3
48

R. Nelson, 'Economic Development From the Perspective of Evolutionary Economic Theory', (2006) Working
Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 2 available at: http://hum.ttu.ee/wp/paper2.pdf, at 4
“strongly inspired by Schumpeter”
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production.49 Building on and expanding further a ‘behavioral’ approach to firms50, Nelson &
Winter posited – against the neo‐classical assumption of firms’ maximization orientation – that
“a firm at any time operates largely according to a set of decision rules that link a domain of
environmental stimuli to a range of responses on the part of firms. While neoclassical theory
would attempt to deduce these decision rules from maximization on the part of the firm, the
behavioral theory simply takes them as given and observable.”51 At the heart of their concept
of the firm as operating within a particular environment was the idea that it would be
impossible to describe the dynamics of change of inter‐organizational decisions without taking
into account the manifold input and output relations between the firm and its – constantly
changing52 – environment. This contention still lies at the base of Nelson’s and Winter’s theory
today: “At the broadest level, and possibly the deepest, the difference between evolutionary
economic theory that is taking shape, and the neoclassical theory that has dominated
microeconomic theorizing over the last thirty years, is that evolutionary theory sees the
economy as always in the process of change, with economic activity almost always proceeding
in a context that is not completely familiar to the actors, or perfectly understood by them.”53 In
the following, this approach has inspired a true plethora of innovative studies in management54
and organizational studies55, industrial organization56, the theory of the firm57, in political
49

R. Nelson/S. Winter, 'Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of Economic Growth: Critique and Prospectus',
(1974) 84 American Economic Review 886-905, 890: “It seems obvious that research on economic growth within the
neoclassical theory is creating new intellectual problems more rapidly than it is solving them. One can continue to
search for solutions to these problems guided by the assumptions of neoclassical theory. Or, one can try a new tack.”
50

See already A. A. Alchian, 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory', (1950) 58 Journal of Political
Economy 211-221, 218: “…the consequence of this is that modes of behavior replace optimum equilibrium
conditions as guiding rules of action.”
51

Nelson & Winter (1974), at 891

52

A. A. Alchian, 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory', (1950) 58 Journal of Political Economy 211-221,
219: “Comparability of resulting situations is destroyed by the changing environment. As a consequence, the
measure of goodness of actions in anything except a tolerable-intolerable sense is lost, and the possibility of an
individual’s converging to the optimum activity via a trial-and-error process disappears. Trial and error becomes life
or death. It cannot serve as a basis of the individual’s method of convergence to a ‘maximum’ or optimum position.
Success is discovered by the economic system through a blanketing shotgun process, not by the individual through a
converging search.”
53

R. Nelson, 'Economic Development From the Perspective of Evolutionary Economic Theory', (2006) Working
Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 2 available at: http://hum.ttu.ee/wp/paper2.pdf, at 1.
See also R. J. Nelson, 'Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change', (1995) 33 Journal of Economic
Literature 48-90.
54

J. T. Mahoney/J. R. Pandian, 'The Resource-Based View Within the Conversation of Strategic Management',
(1992) 13 Strategic Management Journal 363-380
55

M. Zollo/S. Winter, 'Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic Capabilities', (2002) 13 Organization
Science 339-351
56

G. Dosi/F. Malerba, 'Interpreting industrial dynamics twenty years after Nelson and Winter's Evolutionary Theory
of Economic Change', (2002) 11 Industrial and Corporate Change 619-622
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economy58 as well as in – legal theory.59 Meanwhile, the originators of this line of thinking have
themselves embarked on a very fruitful revisiting and further development of some of their
initial starting points60, eventually opening up perspectives for a better understanding of
evolutionary processes as ‘learning processes’.61

III. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT
Among these, sociology as well as business and economics seem to have taken the lead in
further developing evolutionary theories of institutional change,62 spurred by the emergence of
New Institutional Economics centering around Douglass North63 and Oliver Williamson64 ‐ with
“new” evolutionary economics continuing to push for further sophistication of the theoretical
apparatus.65 The importance of this research lies in its untiring – if varied – engagement with
the tension between market and non‐market regulation, a tension which powerfully unfolds
from within the definition of ‘institutions’. In Professor North’s words, “Institutions are the
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They
57

See, for example, R. Whittington/M. Mayer/F. Curto, 'Chandlerism in Post-War Europe: Strategic and Structural
Change in France, Germany and the UK, 1950-1993', (1999) 8 Industrial and Corporate Change 519-551, and the
contributions to P. Dimaggio (ed) The Twenty-First Century Firm. Changing Economic Organization in
International Perspective (Princeton University Press, 2001).
58

P. A. Hall/D. Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage
(Oxford University Press, 2001)
59

See, e.g., G. Teubner, 'Eigensinnige Produktionsregimes: Zur Ko-evolution von Wirtschaft und Recht in den
varieties of capitalism', (1999) 5 Soziale Systeme 7-25 Idiosyncratic Production Regimes: Co-evolution of Economic
and Legal Institutions in the Varieties of Capitalism. In: John Ziman (ed.), The Evolution of Cultural Entities:
Proceedings of the British Academy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, 161-182
60

See, in this context, R. R. Nelson, 'Understanding economic growth as the central task of economic analysis', in F.
Malerba and S. Brusoni (eds), Perspectives on innovation (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 27-41, 31,
highlighting the need to take a more comprehensive look at the institutions shaping technological change, here
referring to ‘social technologies’.
61

Nelson, 2007, preceding note, at 34.

62

R. J. Nelson, 'Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change', (1995) 33 Journal of Economic
Literature 48-90.
63

D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990);
D. C. North, 'Institutions', (1991) 5 J. Econ. Persp. 97-112; D. C. North, 'Economic Performance Through Time',
(1994) 84 American Economic Review 359-368 (Nobel Prize Lecture); D. C. North, Understanding the Process of
Economic Change (Princeton University Press, 2005)
64

O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Free Press/MacMillan, 1985); O. E. Williamson, 'The
Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes', (1981) 19 Journal of Economic Literature 1537-1568.
65

R. Nelson, 'Economic Development From the Perspective of Evolutionary Economic Theory', (2006) Working
Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 2 available at: http://hum.ttu.ee/wp/paper2.pdf, 6:
“The new evolutionary growth theory that is emerging sees economic growth as the result of the coevolution of
technologies, firm and industry structures, and supporting and governing institutions.”
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consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of
conduct), and formal rules (laws, property rights).66 In his important study of 1990, he
observed: “As defined here, they [institutions] therefore are the framework within human
interaction takes place.”67 It is against this relatively flexible definition that North has been
arguing for the central role of institutions for long‐term economic performance. North’s
contribution to an increasingly interdisciplinary dialogue concerning market regulation in
historical perspective can hardly be overestimated. As academic interest in the nature, culture
and trajectory of the market68 among legal scholars, economists, economic historians,
geographers and political economists again soared in recent years69, Douglass North’s
insistence on an interdisciplinary, historically grounded analysis of the different institutions that
structure market behavior proved to be a crucial contribution to a more engaged and more
challenging exchange between scholars in different disciplines. Building on and eventually
substantively expanding his earlier interest in ‘institutions’ per se, North in his more recent
work has adopted a decidedly social‐theory perspective, from which he places a central
emphasis on the nature and volatility of societal change and on the resulting uncertainty, that
characterizes long‐term oriented theorizing. Central to this reorientation is the role of
intentionality with regard to institutional change.70 With this, North connects his important

66

D. C. North, 'Institutions', (1991) 5 J. Econ. Persp. 97-112, at 97

67

D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), at

4
68

See of course already H. C. White, 'Where Do Markets Come From?' (1981) 87 American Journal of Sociology
517-547.
69

See, e.g., J. Lie, 'Sociology of markets', (1997) 23 Annual Review of Sociology 341-360; E. F. Rosenbaum, 'What
is a market? On the methodology of a con-tested concept', (2000) LVIII Review of Social Economy 455-482; N.
Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets. An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies
(Princeton University Press, 2001); see also the contributions to V. Nee/R. Swedberg (eds), The Economic Sociology
of Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 2005), and V. Nee/R. Swedberg, 'Economic Sociology and New
Institutional Economics', in C. Ménard and M. M. Shirley (eds), Handbook of New Institutional Economics
(Springer, 2005), 789-818. Besides the recent renaissance in economic sociology, the contributions by scholars
interested in the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ are of particular interest in this regard: see, e.g., the landmark volume by
P. A. Hall/D. Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage
(Oxford University Press, 2001), and the preceding work by D. Soskice, 'Divergent Production Regimes:
Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980's and 1990's', in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks
and J. D. Stephens (eds), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 1999),
101-134, and J. R. Hollingsworth, 'The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism', in C. Crouch and W.
Streeck (eds), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. Mapping Convergence and Diversity (Sage, 1997), 133147, as well as W. Streeck, 'Introduction: Explorations into the Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism in Germany and
Japan', in W. Streeck and K. Yamamura (eds), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism (Cornell University Press,
2001), 1-38
70

D. C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton University Press, 2005)
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institutionalist framework to the increasingly influential71 work in behavioral finance72 and
behavioral law & economics73 and makes thus a powerful argument for the necessity to take
the complexity of market structures and behaviors seriously – a lesson which will continue to
inspire future interdisciplinary research not only in corporate finance and corporate
governance74, but also in economic sociology, geography and regulatory theory.75 Next to the
field of economic geography that has been gaining new attraction for economists and globally
oriented policy makers with regard to regional differences in economic growth and
development76, and regulatory theory, which over the past fifteen years has become something
of an umbrella concept for interdisciplinary governance studies77, it is in economic sociology
that we can see a number of important strides in recent years, both with regard to its

71

See the hesitant treatment, at the time, by one of the most astute scholars of the ECMH himself: E. Fama, 'Market
Efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance', (1998) 49 Journal of Financial Economics 283-306, 284:
“anomalies”.
72

See the foundational work on the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis [ECMH] by E. Fama, 'Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work', (1970) 31 Journal of Finance 383-417; M. C. Jensen, 'Some
anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency', (1970) 6 Journal of Financial Economics 95-101; R. J. Gilson/R.
Kraakman, 'The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency', (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 549-644 – see also R. J.
Gilson/R. Kraakman, 'The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias', (2003) 28
Journal of Corporate Law 715, and L. Stout, 'The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance', (2003) 28 Journal of Corporate Law 635.
73

See the contributions to C. Sunstein (ed) Behavioural Law & Economics (University of Chicago Press, 2000); for
a very informative discussion and overview, see L. Klöhn, Kapitalmarkt, Spekulation und Behavioral Finance. Eine
interdisziplinäre und vergleichende Analyse zum Fluch und Segen der Spekulation und ihrer Regulierung durch
Markt und Recht (Duncker & Humblot, 2006), 80-153.
74

See the brilliant example: R. Aguilera/D. Rupp/C. A. Williams/J. Ganapathi, 'Putting the S Back in Corporate
Social Responsibility: a Multi-Level Theory of Social Change in Organizations', (2004) 32 Academy of Management
Review 836-863 [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567842].
75

As a representative example of work grown out of long-term analysis of the shortcomings of the ECMH, see the
scholarship by R. Thaler, 'Anomalies - The January Effect', (1987) 1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 197-201; R.
Thaler, 'The End of Behavioral Finance', (1999) 55 Financial Analysts Journal 12-17; see now R. Thaler/C.
Sunstein, Nudge. Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (Yale University Press, 2008).
76

See, e.g., the World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report ‘RESHAPING ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY’; see the
contributions to G. L. Clark/M. P. Feldman/M. S. Gertler (eds), Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography (Oxford
University Press, 2003); see also the famous launch by Paul Krugman in 1992 of ‘new economic geography’ [P.
Krugman, Geography and Trade (MIT Press, 1992)], and P. Krugman, 'What’s new about the new economic
geography?' (1998) 14 Oxford Review of Economics & Politics 7-17; see further relatively recent creation of a new
academic journal in this area: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY (OUP, since 2001), complementing among
others the long-standing ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY (Clark University, since 1925).
77

See, e.g., the overview by S. Burris/M. Kempa/C. Shearing, 'Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary
Review of Current Scholarship', (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 1-66; see also the meanwhile seminal article in legal
scholarship by O. Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought', (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342-469; for a refreshing perspective with regard to the EU, see
C. Möllers, 'European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept', (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 313336; with regard to global financial regulation, see the poignant contribution by J. Black/D. Rouch, 'The
development of global markets as rule-makers: engagement and legitimacy', (2008) Law and Financial Markets
Review 218-233.
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engagement with institutional economics as well as with law.78 It is from here that important
impulses for a more serious, interdisciplinary study of ‘law in context’, ‘law & society’ and
‘social norms’ in their relation to traditional jurisprudence are likely going to be received still.79
Surely, not only at a time such as when THE ECONOMIST would dedicate an issue to ‘Modern
Economic Theory. Where it went wrong‐ and how the crisis is changing it’ with a number of
outspoken defamations of financial economics’ hubris concerning perfect markets80 have
economists cast models into doubt that had been designed to explain economic growth. As
indicated above, after Keynes’ 1936 General Theory and its eventual interim relativization (and
subsequent revival81), the theoretical advances by North and other scholars of New Institutional
Economics82 are among the most sophisticated and most promising economist contributions to
an integrated analysis of economic developments. It is in fact on the basis of and in
engagement with the wealth and the challenging, analytical potential of the institutionalist
framework that other disciplines such as political economy, economic sociology, economic
geography and, certainly, law have been developing over the past decades. This context makes
for an intriguing moment to engage in an interdisciplinary analysis of the evolutionary
trajectories of law and economics. The proffered depictions, explanations and assessments as
they are voiced with regard to the 2007/2008 financial and economic crisis, not only by those
who had always ‘known’, ‘warned’ or were ‘ignored’, feed into and complement what will
continue to unfold as a crucially important theoretical engagement with the models and
toolkits economists, lawyers and social theorists have been relying on since the early 1980s.
78

See only V. Nee/R. Swedberg, 'Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics', in C. Ménard and M. M.
Shirley (eds), Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Springer, 2005), 789-818, 795: “Slowly […] it has been
realized by economic sociologists that law constitutes a central part of the modern economy…”. See, in this context,
R. Swedberg, 'The Case for an Economic Sociology of Law', (2003) 32 Theory and Society 1-37.
79

See, e.g., the definition of ‘institution’ provided by Nee and Swedberg, op. cit., 797-798: “An institution may be
conceptualized as a dominant system of interrelated informal and formal elements – customs, shared beliefs, norms,
and rules – which actors orient their actions to when they pursue their interests. In this view, institutions are
dominant social structures which provide a conduit for social and collective action by facilitating and structuring the
interests of actors and enforcing principal agent relationships. It follows from this interest-related definition that
institutional change involves not simply remaking the formal rules, but requires the realignment of interests, norms,
and power.”
80

THE ECONOMIST, July 18th-24th, 2009, 12, 68-72

81

R. Skidelsky, Keynes. The Return of the Master (Allen Lane, 2009); P. Davidson, The Keynes Revolution. The
Path to Global Economic Prosperity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)
82

For an interim excellent introduction and overview see S. Voigt, Neue Institutionenökonomik (Mohr Siebeck
(UTB), 2002); meanwhile, see O. E. Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance', (2005) 95 American Economic
Review 1-18, and E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton University Press, 2005), and the
contributions to E. Ostrom, 'Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional
analysis', (2007) 3 Journal of Institutional Economics 239-264. A very instructive paper is still O. E. Williamson,
'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead', (2000) 38 Journal of Economic Literature 595613.
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While the need for an interdisciplinary and integrated study of the current crisis thus lies in the
evident ambiguity of the very starting points of any assessment83, the promise of an
interdisciplinary study of institutions goes further still: precisely because of the distinct
premises and normative orientations in legal and economic thinking, there is a great need for
continued translation of methodological approaches in both disciplines.84 The appearance of
one in the other – economics in law85 and law in economics86 – has been indeed been increased
rather than limited the need for further dialogue and translation.
As legal scholars and economists continue to demarcate the boundaries of states and markets,
we can discern a lot of parallel engagement with evolutionary theory’s conceptualizations of
institutional lock‐in87 and path‐dependency88: such studies are particularly relevant with regard
to lawyers’ and economists’ ongoing attempts to gain a better understanding of the meaning
and lessons from ‘market failure’, a term that has frequently been referred to not only for an
identification of the occasion but also of the scope of state intervention.89 Market failure thus
presents a formidable example for the illustration of the urgent need of collaborative and
interdisciplinary analysis of the institutions involved in successful or failing regulation. For law, a
study of market failure goes to the heart of its own understanding, as the definition of a legal
concept of market is intimately tied to the foundational understanding of law as such90,
83

For an intriguing perspective on the correlation of different periodizations, see J. Mokyr, 'The Knowledge Society:
Theoretical and Historical Underpinnings', (2005) faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jmokyr/Unitednations.PDF .
84

G.-P. Calliess/M. Renner, 'Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance', (2009) 22
Ratio Juris 260-280, 262
85

P. H. Rubin, 'Why is the Common Law Efficient?' (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 51-63; G. L. Priest, 'The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules', (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 65-82; H.
Eidenmüller, Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts
(Siebeck Mohr, 1995); D. Kennedy, 'Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power', (1982) 41 Maryland Law Review 563
86

L. Bernstein, 'Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry', (1992)
21 Journal of Legal Studies 115-157; G. K. Hadfield, 'Privatizing Commercial Law', (2001) Regulation 40-45; A.
Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge University
Press, 2006)
87

B. W. Arthur, 'Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events', (1989) 99 The
Economic Journal 116-131
88

Arthur (1989), preceding note; B. W. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy
(University of Michigan Press, 1994); P. A. David, 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY', (1985) 75 American
Economic Review 332-337; see also W. J. Baumol, 'Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What the
Long-Run Data Show', (1986) 76 American Economic Review 1072-1085; M. J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law
and Economics', (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 641-668
89
90

R. O. Zerbe Jr./H. McCurdy, 'The End of Market Failure', (2000) 23 Regulation 10-14, at 10

R. L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State', (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly
470-494; R. Wiethölter, 'Artikel Wirtschaftsrecht', in A. Görlitz (ed) Handlexikon zur Rechtswissenschaft
(Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972), 531-539; D. Campbell, 'The Relational Constitution of Contract and the
Limits of 'Economics': Kenneth Arrow on the Social Background of Markets', in S. Deakin and J. Michie (eds),
Contracts, Co-operation, and Competition. Studies in Economics, Management and Law (Oxford University Press,
1997), 307-336; P. Zumbansen, 'The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract', (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies 191-233 [available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=988610]; see also C. E. Lindblom, 'Market and
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because it cannot simply presuppose a market as such.91 In turn, for economics, and for New
Institutional Economics in particular, the question is whether the theoretical framework has a
convincing analytical and conceptual grip on contemporary complex regulatory constellations.
As has repeatedly been highlighted by Paul David, the general observation that ‘history
matters’92 by itself is about as explanatory or illuminating as the claim that market failures
challenge the embedding legal enforcement system in a straight‐forward, causal manner93:
“From the foregoing it may be seen that a proper understanding of path‐dependence, and of
the possibilities of externalities leading to market failure, is not without interesting implications
for economic policy. But those are not at all the sorts of glib conclusions that some critics have
alleged must follow if one believes that history really matters – namely, that government
should try to pick winners rather than let markets make mistakes. Quite the contrary….[…]. One
thing that public policy could do is to try to delay the market from committing to the future
inextricably, before enough information has been obtained about the likely technical or
organizational and legal implications, of an early, precedent‐setting decision.”94 In another
paper, David observed that “[I]f there are ways thus to represent the coevolution of
microeconomic behavior with regard to technology choices (technical standardization), or
conformance with social norms (custom and convention) and correlated patterns of ideology or
beliefs carrying normative force (subjective conformism), the explanatory apparatus available
to economists studying long‐term trends in technology and social institutions will surely be
much more powerful.”95 As pointed out by Duncan Kennedy, in a comment on Robert Clark,
‘costs’ are a merely allusive concept, that can hardly carry enough weight on their own to
identify or even justify action on the part of a public or private actor.96 Tightly connected to
Democracy. Obliquely', (1995) 28 Political Science and Politics 684-688, 685: “Market rules do not permit one
simply to appropriate what one wants. Appropriating another person’s labor we call slavery, and appropriating assets
we call theft. Nor do market rules provide any social instrument for collective reassignment of claims.”
91

See only Hale, previous note; see also the instructive discussion and analysis in F. Johns, 'Performing Power: The
Deal, Corporate Rule, and the Constitution of Global Legal Order', (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 116-138.
92

P. A. David, 'Path dependence, its critics and the quest for ‘historical economics’', in P. Garrouste and S.
Ioannides (eds), Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present (Edwad Elgar, 2000),
93

P. A. David, 'Path dependence in economic processes: implications for policy analysis in dynamical systems
contexts', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundations of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 151194
94

P. A. David, 'Path dependence, its critics and the quest for ‘historical economics’', in P. Garrouste and S.
Ioannides (eds), Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present (Edwad Elgar, 2000), , ms. at
14
95
96

David (2008), note 23, at 175

D. Kennedy, 'Cost-Reduction as Legitimation', (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1275-1283, at 1281: “an obstacle
because it makes the world as it is look rational and necessary, even just (who can object to "cost reduction"?), as
opposed to arbitrary and contingent. This is a misrepresentation that has an effect: it diverts energy from the job of
finding the truths we need to know about the world if we are to be effective in trans- forming it; it diverts energy
from the task of figuring out what the world should be like.”
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such an observation is David’s own contention that we must apply a much more differentiated
tool‐kit to explore the interaction between different market actors over time in order to get a
better understanding of why things go wrong and how we arrive at such an assessment. What
emerges from Professor David’s observations is a cautionary approach towards a concept of
market failure that is not again re‐embedded in a comprehensive historical and systematic
institutional study. ‘History matters’, then, is not a sophisticated enough proposal to engage in
a layered, interdisciplinary analysis of how which institutions play a crucial role in the
organization of today’s market economies. While the concept of path dependency has been
developed primarily with confined, nationally grown markets in mind, its relevance for
transnational markets and transnational regulatory theory follows from the realization of the
stickiness of existing (and newly created) regulatory structures, something which – as before in
the case of lex mercatoria97 – any globally or transnationally aspiring regulatory concept will
necessarily have to take into account.98

IV. TOWARDS A RENEWED INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE
What follows from the above is that an evolutionary perspective is crucial in the emerging new
phase of interdisciplinary inquiry into the relationship between ‘public’ and ‘private’ ordering,
‘state’ vs. ‘market’ regulation and that there is a continued need to further refine the concept
of ‘institution’. For such an interdisciplinary dialogue to unfold in an effective way, the
continued engagement with each other’s methodological starting points and premises is
crucial. It is thus necessary to open up respective toolkits and analytical frameworks to
comparative and interdisciplinary scrutiny.
It is then against this background, that we can begin to see how reflections, internal to
economist and economic‐historical theorizing, are in fact mirrored, paralleled and sometimes
even anticipated in other disciplines that have been engaging, one way or the other, with the
concept or the idea of institutions in the recent past.99 Within law, and in particular outside of
97
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contract law which has attracted a plethora of focused assessments from the part of New
Institutional Economics100, there has certainly been an intensive and fruitful engagement with
NIE in corporate law theory.101 More recently still, NIE has been subject to lively exchanges
within Public International Law.102 Another example is the recent revival of lawyers’ interest in
Hayek’s idea of spontaneous evolution103 Partly in answer to such developments, partly in
building on earlier starting points in Marx, Durkheim and Weber, the recently newly burgeoning
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field of economic sociology104 has been making extremely fruitful contributions to an altogether
inspiring, interdisciplinary discussion about the nature of markets and institutions.105 For their
part, lawyers have been pressured to respond to this challenge from a particular set of
perspectives, partly constituted through the uncertainties connected to increasingly
contractualized public services and a fundamental reconsideration of law’s role in market
regulation106, partly through an intricate mix of privatized107 as well as transnational108 modes
of norm‐generation. This development within legal doctrine and legal theory – in the midst of
which we find a vividly continuing debate about ‘social norms’109 – is of interest beyond the
unsurprisingly recurring, traditional lawyers’ laments concerning the loss of regulatory
capability and sovereignty.110 Even before the 2007/2008 economic crisis began to unfold, it
had become clear to regulatory and legal theoreticians that the transformation of Western
104
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welfare states in the context of an IT‐driven globalization of markets of goods, production,
services and migration posed a new set of conceptual challenges that could henceforth only be
approached from within an interconnected interdisciplinary agenda.111
And yet, despite these manifold intersections, the different strands of evolutionary theory have
not been brought together for a comprehensive analysis of the change of legal and economic
institutions. The elephant in the room continues to be the tension between economic and legal
governance, or more precisely the relation between the social order as conceived either from
an economic or from a legal perspective. So far unanswered remains the question regarding the
reasons for the existence of a legal order beyond its affirmation as an enforcement framework
for market ordering. As shown by Donald Elliott’s astute analysis of evolutionary theories in
legal and economic scholarship twenty‐five years ago, “Economic theories of legal evolution
also depend on the assumption that a legal system already exists.”112 By not, however, being
able to answer whether the legal system predates – historically or normatively – the economic
system, the economic story of markets and their embeddedness in a legal enforcement
mechanism remains on a purely abstract level: it distinguishes between the market and the
state by resorting to terms such as market and non‐market order mechanisms. This, however,
attempts to answer the question as to what constitutes the relation between the two spheres
without providing for a definition of or a justification of the distinction in the first place. That
the legal system exists to remedy market failures does not explain whether the market failure is
in fact something else than a political or, regulatory failure.113 It is here, where the evolutionary
strands in law, economics and sociology have much to contribute.

V. CONCLUSION: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
It is a certain irony, that not only the politically self‐conscious exclamation that ‘We are all
Realists Now’, resounding many years ago114, would eventually be succeeded by the realization
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that, in fact, ‘We are all Economists Now’115, but that we seem to now be experiencing yet
another relativization of perspective. A pronouncement of the sort ‘We are all Interdisciplinary
Governance scholars now’, would, however, have only a faint ring to it. The underlying
conundrum is that of the trajectories of institutional and normative change, which occupy much
of economic and legal inquiry, before and in light of the global financial and economic crisis of
2007‐2009. Meanwhile, the intellectual competition over the primacy of economic or legal
reasoning in the imagination of (‘sustainable’, ‘good’, ‘just’) governance occurs in the shadow of
a dramatic transformation of the spaces for economic and legal ordering. Precisely at a moment
where legal scholars, political scientists and sociologists have come to accept the transnational
challenge to the traditional concepts of law and legal regulation116, also the economists’
ascription to law, the state and to the correlation between the two as constituting the relevant
enforcement framework for economic action needs to be revisited. It is here where we can
identify an urgent need but already promising contours of an interdisciplinary inquiry into the
nature of ‘institutions’ of economic and legal governance. Much seems to be at stake: as a
utopia of transnational governance continues to linger at the horizon of libertarian imaginations
of globally integrated markets, neither discipline appears yet to have an appropriate
governance theory at hand. The space of human interaction and of regulation beyond the
nation state can be depicted either as the Wild West of unrestrained individual liberty, or as an
extremely fragile and contested space of struggles over recognition, politics and community.117
In the face of this, has ‘law lost its lieu?”118 Is the ‘Global Bukowina’, which inspired legal
sociologists at the respective beginnings and ends of the twentieth century, a realm of law, of
social norms or of economic liberties?119 What are we to make of these distinctions, after all?
To be sure, this process does not continue in a quiet state of contentment and wonder, but
rather in surprise, happenstance and terror.120 We understand concurring work on ‘global
governance’ to provide an important contribution to a more adequate analysis of the pressing
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legitimacy and accountability concerns arising from a fragmented regulatory landscape.121 In an
attempt to complement this research, we posit that an evolutionary perspective on governance
offers a further set of insights into the changes in legal and economic governance. It is from this
perspective, that we might see emerging ‘lessons’ from a parallel observation of legal and
economic governance. Drawing on the distinction between markets and hierarchies, as
developed and expressed in work following Coase122 and Williamson123 on the one hand and on
the analysis of markets as spaces of discovery, learning and adaptation124, on the other, we an
increasingly narrow applicatory space for a traditional understanding of legal regulation, as
informed by a set of constitutional, normative ideals and embedded in a stable institutional
framework. In this situation, however, we are faced with the ‘stripping down’ of law from a
functionalist perspective. This function, in a context of a dramatically changing institutional
environment125, re‐emerges as a stubborn insistence on the distinction between legal and
illegal. In concert with ‘economic governance’, legal governance finds its place and calling in
contra‐factually upholding a normative aspiration to continue to make the distinction between
legal and illegal – despite the absence of its traditional institutional framework. Law, then, can
only purport to illustrate the challenges of having to identify, create and constantly re‐adapt
the context in which it is possible to make this distinction. This is what is meant with the need
for contemporary governance theories to look beyond traditional concepts of political order
and democratic governance.126
As already illustrated by evolutionary theory’s noted ‘language deficit’127, the same struggle
over semantics marks the interdisciplinary confusion over the terms, basis and contours of
‘governance’. While it is true, that “[t]oday’s problems are determined by the fact that the
fundamental structural change of functional differentiation has destroyed the Old European
semantics without residue, and that even the most hectic post‐modern polysémies can be
121
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understood only as a restless search for socially adequate self‐descriptions,” catastrophes and
the change in social structures lead to a ruining of semantics.128 Communication, then, from the
perspective of systems theory, constituting the semantics of the particular observing systems
such as law, politics, economics and others, is, in the context of fiercely competing ‘truth’
claims brought forward from different social rationalities, inevitably thrown back onto itself.
The legal system must – and will – process the change in its environment by relying on its very
own available operations129 that now will follow into the depths of societal differentiation to
focus on what Mariana Valverde refers to as the small ‘T’s in comparison to the large ‘T’ in a
search for truthfulness.130 The same idea applies to other social systems as well, as the recent
theorizing over ‘institutional diversity’ amply illustrates.131 Taken together, we are left with
contradicting impressions of a world falling apart, of reference systems eroding, on the one
hand, and of interdisciplinary enrichment, inspiration and emerging understandings on the
other.
This volume accepts this apparent contradiction by bringing together research from different
fields and with different perspectives on the problem of institutional evolution. The basis for
this volume was an interdisciplinary research project on Law, the State and Evolutionary
Theory, jointly conducted by the Collaborative Research Center Transformations of the State at
the University of Bremen (Germany)132 and the German Law Journal.133 In addition to work
developed in this context, the present volume contains a number of chapters by some of the
most prominent evolutionary theory scholars working today. The collection thus aims at
providing a reference point for scholars from different traditions and different fields for an
inquiry into the meaning and promises of evolutionary theory for future theorizing about legal
and economic governance. The authors contributing to this volume specifically employ
evolutionary theory in order to explore the challenges arising from the fundamental
transformation of statehood that has been so powerfully captured by Saskia Sassen as an
erosion of state sovereignty both from ‘below’, brought about by processes of privatization and
emerging forms of public‐private governance, and from ‘above,’ through processes of
transnationalization of collaborative, regulatory governance.134
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By contributing to an ongoing exploration of evolutionary approaches to economics, law and
their respective intersections, its first and foremost goal is to provide an overview of the variety
of evolutionary perspectives, and how these have been contributing to the design of theories of
institutional change in response to the contemporary complex realities of legal and economic
change. In that sense, the following chapters should be understood as providing a necessary
first step for putting forward for discussion a number of methodological elements towards an
evolutionary theory that can fruitfully be employed in both law and economics in order to
address some of the most pressing questions of contemporary social theory.
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